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COMMENT
EDITOR'S NOTE:
This article is a follow-up to a Comment which appeared in the
October 1972 issue of the NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL. That
comment, The Florida Oil Spill and Pollution Control Act: An
Intrusion Into the Federal Maritime Domain, appearedsubsequent to
the lower federal court decision in American Waterways Operators,
Inc. v. Askew, but prior to the Supreme Court's reversal of that
decision. This article is designed to fill any voids which may have been
created between the time of the appearanceof the initial comment and
the final disposition of the case.

Askew v.
American Waterways Operators, Inc.,' Revisited
On December 10, 1971, a three judge federal court in the Fifth
2
Circuit ruled that the Florida Oil Spill and Pollution Control Act
was unconstitutional. According to the opinion written by Judge
Tjoflat, the Florida act was in direct conflict with the Water Quality
Improvement Act (WQIA),3 a 1970 amendment to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA),4 and was thus an invalid intrusion
into the federal maritime domain.
But, according to the Supreme Court decision of April 18, 1973,
written by Justice Douglas, 5 there was no apparent conflict between
the state and the federal legislation. 6 The Florida act was viewed as
merely an exercise of Florida's police power over maritime matters
and was considered a vital part of an integrated effort to control oil
pollution. Thus, the lower court decision was reversed, and the
Florida Oil Spill and Pollution Control Act was allowed to stand.
Judge Tjoflat's analysis of the applicable law in the admiralty area
began with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution7 which has long
been interpreted as placing matters of admiralty law within the
power of Congress. He also relied heavily on Southern Pacific Co. v.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
April
6.
7.

335 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
Fla. Stat. Ann. sec. 376 (Supp. 1972).
33 U.S.C. sec. 1161 et seq. (1971).
33 U.S.C. sec. 1151 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
Notice of appeal filed by defendant on December 23, 1972. Probable jurisdiction noted on
17, 1973. 405 U.S. (1972).
93 Sup. Ct. 1590 (1973).
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-

tion . . ."
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Jensen8 which held that a maritime worker on a vessel in navigable
waters could not constitutionally receive an award under New York
workmen's compensation law, because the remedy in admiralty was
exclusive; and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart9 which involved a
similar factual situation and stood for the principle that Congress is
powerless to confer on the states authority to legislate within the
admiralty jurisdiction. Lastly, Judge Tjoflat considered the Admiralty
Extension Act 10 which states that:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall
extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or
property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding
that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land.
With this legal framework in mind Judge Tjoflat then considered
the provisions of the Florida act. His main objection was the
imposition of much stricter standards of liability than were imposed
by the WQIA. While the federal act subjected ship owners and
terminal facilities to liability without fault up to $14 million and $8
million respectively for clean-up costs incurred by the federal
government as a result of oil spills, the Florida act created unlimited
liability without fault for both state clean-up costs and damages to
private individuals. The Florida act also leaves the offender little
chance of formulating a valid defense," while the WQIA would
excuse shippers and owners of onshore and offshore facilities who
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that spillage was caused by
an act of God, an act of war, negligence on the part of the federal
2
government, or the act of omission of a third party.'
Such state legislation was viewed by the district court as not only
dealing with maritime tort law which it considered under exclusive
federal domain due to the Admiralty Extension Act, but also in direct
conflict with federal legislation governing disposition of claims
involving coastal oil pollution.
Justice Douglas' analysis reaches the opposite conclusion. He
begins by considering whether or not there is in fact any conflict
between the state and federal law. As he points out, the WQIA itself
allows state regulation in this area as long as it is not in conflict with
federal legislation. 13 The sections on liability in the Florida act which
8. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
9. 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
10. 46 U.S.C. sec. 740 (1971).
11. Fla. Stat. Ann. sec. 376.11(6)(b)(Supp. 1972).
12. See, The Florida Oil Spill and Pollution Control Act, supra note 1, at 621-22 for other
differences between the state and federal legislation.
13. 33 U.S.C. see. 1161(o)(1,2, and 3)(1971).
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Judge Tjoflat found so objectionable, are viewed by Justice Douglas as
supplementary to, not in conflict with, the WQIA. The federal act, as
far as terms of liability are concerned, considers liability for clean-up
costs incurred only by the federal government. Liability for state
clean-up costs and for damages to private inviduals is not included.
On the other hand, the Florida act does create liability for state
clean-up costs and damages to private individuals, matters separate
from those considered by the WQIA. In Justice Douglas' opinion there
is absolutely no conflict, the state is simply providing supplementary
remedies and terms of liability which the federal act did not provide.
Secondly, Justice Douglas determines whether, when in the absence of federal pre-emption and statutory conflict, there is any reason why a state may not constitutionally exercise its policy power
respecting maritime activities concurrently with the federal government. Initially he questions Judge Tjoflat's use of the two cases,
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart. In
Justice Douglas' opinion these decisions have been limited by
subsequent holdings of the Supreme Court to their particular factual
situations. According to Justice Frankfurter writing for the Supreme
Court in Romero v. InternationalTerminal Operating Co., Jensen and
its progeny concern only isolated circumstances where "state law
must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law when this
Court finds inroads on a harmonious system."' 14 These limitations still
allow for a great deal of state action. In just v. Chambers15 the
Supreme Court approved the decision in The City of Norwalk 16 which
stated that a state may modify or supplement maritime law provided
the state action is not hostile "to the characteristic features of the
maritime law or inconsistent with federal legislation."' 1 7 The principle has been established that a state through the exercise of its police
power, may legislate admiralty laws applicable within its territorial
limits provided these rules do no contravene any federal laws nor
work any prejudice to the characteristic features of the general
maritime law, nor interfere with its harmony and uniformity in both
its national and international aspects.
In contrast to the district court, Justice Douglas interprets the
Admiralty Extension Act as not supplying the exclusive remedy for
sea to shore torts.18 The act is viewed as merely extending the limits
of federal admiralty jurisdiction, without at the same time excluding
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Romero v. InternationalTerminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373 (1959).
312 U.S. 383 (1941).
55 F. 98 (1893).
312 U.S. 383, 388 (1941).
Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit,362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960).
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state action which complies with the principle laid down in Just v.
Chambers.
Thus, where state legislation is supplementary to federal legislation
in the maritime field, specifically sea to shore damages resulting from
oil pollution, and is in no manner in conflict with federal legislation, it
is constitutional. The Florida Oil Spill and Pollution Control Act lies
within these restrictions and is not precluded by the Admiralty
Extension Act.
This decision will have significant ramifications throughout the
20
9
United States. Such states as Florida, Maine' and California will
not be forced to rely solely on the relatively ineffective provisions of
the WQIA. Their coastal areas can now be protected by both the
federal legislation and by state legislation which provides strict
standards of liability.

19. See, Maine's Oil Handling Law, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, sec. 541-57 (Supp. 1972).
20. See, Miller Anti-Pollution Act, Cal. Harb. and Nay. Code, sec. 293 (West Supp. 1972).

